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1 “You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people 
some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” 
(Attributed to Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1865) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that theoretical research on opportunistic political cycles is very intuitive 
and well developed, empirical literature produced mixed results in attempts to find convincing 
evidence of opportunistic cycles for almost a quarter of a century after the pioneering work of 
Nordhaus [1975]. The evidence from developed countries is particularly weak.
1 The apparent 
contradiction between the theory and evidence created an intellectual puzzle. Why did many tests 
fail? Should the theory or the empirics be held responsible? Motivated by this gap, several recent 
theoretical works argued that opportunistic cycles should be most sizable in countries with 
immature democratic regimes (Gonzalez 2000 and Shi and Svensson 2002a). The evidence has 
been strongly supportive of this view: studies of country-level panels with large presence of 
young democracies and within-country studies of imperfect democracies have shown robust 
significant fiscal cycles almost exclusively.
2 Many of these tests, however, suffer from severe 
data limitations, in particular, insufficient frequency and, often, too high level of aggregation of 
fiscal spending. This paper sheds further light on the puzzle: we provide strong evidence of 
opportunistic cycles using regional monthly panel from a decade-old democracy–Russia, 
demonstrate that use of lower frequency data leads to underestimation of cycles explaining 
weakness of results in previous studies, and document the link between cycles, on the one hand, 
and democracy and transparency, on the other. 
                                                 
1 Little empirical support for opportunistic cycles in developed countries was found in Klein [1996], Berger and 
Woitek [1997], Reid [1998], and Alesina and Roubini [1992]. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen [1997], Drazen [2000], 
and Franzese [2002] provide detailed surveys of theoretical and empirical literatures. 
2 See evidence and discussion in Brender and Drazen [2003] as well as evidence produced by Ames [1987], 
Gonzalez [2002], Krueger and Turan [1993], Drazen and Eslava [2003], Block [2001, 2002], Block, Ferree, and 
Singh [2003], Shi and Svensson [2002a, 2002b], Schuknecht [2000], and Drazen and Eslava [2003]. 
  2Russia’s regional elections of executives provide an ideal case for an empirical test of 
opportunistic political cycle theory. First, Russia is a typical immature democracy: it is 
characterized by dependent media, nontransparent government, and a large fraction of an 
uninformed and myopic electorate. Since the theory predicts sizable cycles in immature 
democracies, one should expect to find evidence of cycles on Russian data. Simple plots of 
actual series of regional spending in many cases suggest vivid increases in spending prior to 
elections (examples are given in Figure I). Second, high uniformity in electoral rules and scope 
for policymaking among regions combined with high variation in the level of democracy and 
government transparency help to identify the effect of the latter on the magnitude of political 
cycles. Third, detailed monthly regional panel data allow more powerful tests of the theory than 
the ones done so far. 
We find sizable and short-lived cycles in public expenditure and its composition and no 
cycles in growth or inflation controlling for region-specific characteristics, federal trend, 
seasonality, and ideology. Monthly panel data allow us careful measurement of even very short 
cycles. This turned out to be important because most sizable shifts in spending happen within a 
month or two from elections. We show that use of quarterly data leads to severe underestimation 
of cycles because the opposite-sign shifts in public expenditure around elections cancel out in 
low frequency data. Previous empirical studies of cycles in developing countries used quarterly 
or lower frequency data.
3 Short length of the cycle, however, does not undermine its economic 
significance. First, the cycle is primarily targeted at poor voters who have the worst possibilities 
for consumption smoothing: the largest fluctuations are observed in repayment of wage arrears to 
public workers and spending on welfare and other public assistance programs. Second, 
                                                 
3 To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that uses monthly data is Berger and Voitek [1997]; it rejects 
hypothesis of opportunistic cycles for the German developed democracy.  
  3irrespective of the driving force of the cycle–asymmetric information or voter myopia–it 
indicates the absence of checks and balances on politicians that make politicians accountable in 
mature democracies (i.e., separation of powers, free press, active NGOs, etc.). These institutions 
should provide voters with fuller information and longer-term control over politicians and, 
therefore, limit possibilities for misuse of public office for private gain. Large and short-lived 
cycles, therefore, provide evidence of poor long-term accountability of politicians.  
In line with recent theoretical results, we find that proxies for informational symmetry, 
voter awareness, and the level of regional democracy significantly reduce cycles. In addition, 
cycles get smaller over time. The latter could be an indication of a general phenomenon: as 
democracy matures, voters learn and independent media and civil society develop, or of a 
Russia-specific effect of an informal change in federal control over regional budgets from one 
Russian president to the other (data are insufficient to distinguish between these two 
explanations of the time effect). Finally, we find that cycles in fiscal policy instruments 
significantly increase the popularity of incumbents and help them win.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formulate 
testable hypotheses motivated by theoretical literature. Section III describes the data. Section IV 
presents results. Conclusions follow in Section V. 
II. HYPOTHESES 
First, we test predictions of the classic opportunistic political cycle models. Nordhaus 
[1975] built the first formal model of opportunistic political cycles based on Phillips curve with 
adaptive expectations of voters. In the model, naïve voters get consistently fooled by a pre-
electoral inflationary boom despite the recession following election. The model predicts political 
cycles in growth, unemployment, and inflation. Rogoff and Sibert [1988], Rogoff [1990], and 
  4Persson and Tabellini [1990] reconciled rational expectations with opportunistic political cycles 
in dynamic signaling models with asymmetric information about politicians’ competence. In 
particular, Rogoff and Sibert [1988] and Rogoff [1990] focus on political budget cycle in which 
voters reward pre-electoral distortion in public spending because it signals about an incumbent’s 
ability to provide public goods. Rogoff and Sibert’s model predicts a pre-electoral fall in tax 
collection along with increases in deficit and inflation; Rogoff’s model focuses on the pre-
electoral shift in composition of government spending away from investment, observed with a 
lag, towards more visible public consumption. We look at the dynamics of a wide range of public 
expenditure items, composition of the budget, growth and inflation to test predictions of these 
theories. 
Second, we study determinants of the magnitude of the budget cycle. Asymmetry of 
information about politicians’ competence plays a central role in rational opportunistic cycles. 
Recent literature extends the basic set up of Rogoff’s model to illustrate that transparency 
modeled as the probability that voters get correct exogenous signal about an incumbent’s 
competence (Gonzalez 2000) and awareness of voters defined as a share of perfectly informed 
voters (Shi and Svensson 2002a) reduce the magnitude of the cycle. Furthermore, Gonzalez 
[2000] introduces the level of democracy directly into the model. Democracy has a non-
monotone effect on the cycle: First, if the cost of enforcing political turnover is prohibitively 
high for voters (as is the case in dictatorships), then politicians do not have an incentive to 
engage in costly signaling, and therefore, there are no cycles. Second, when change in office can 
be enforced, the cycle decreases with democracy because it ensures institutional checks and 
balances on government that allow voters to observe politicians’ competence directly with higher 
probability (i.e., free media). We test whether these theoretical predictions are consistent with the 
data by looking at how cross-sectional variation in voter awareness (measured by education and 
  5urbanization), transparency (measured by indices of government transparency and media 
freedom), and democracy influence the cycles.  
In young democracies, like Russia, emerging NGOs and independent media accumulate 
experience in collecting, packaging, and disseminating information about politicians and their 
policies while voters learn how to process this information. Thus, cycles should get smaller over 
time as learning proceeds and civil society develops (Drazen and Brender 2003). We test for the 
effect of time on the cycle. Apart from learning, however, the time effect may also be attributed 
to the difference in scope for fiscal manipulation by regional governments under Yeltsin and 
Putin’s administrations (Rogoff [1990] discusses the effects of restraining fiscal policies on 
political cycles). We attempt to separate these hypotheses. 
All opportunistic cycle theories predict that pre-electoral manipulations are rewarded by 
voters. In rational signaling models, a cycle has costs (policy distortions) and benefits 
(transmitting information about politicians’ competence). If voters learn politicians’ type 
directly, for instance, through well-functioning independent media, signaling has no value to 
voters. In fact, in developed democracies voters reward politicians for restrained fiscal policies 
(Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares 1998 and Brender 2003). As a last step of our analysis, we 
investigate whether it pays to pursue pre-electoral fiscal expansion in a maturing democracy.  
III. THE DATA 
The comprehensive list of regional governor elections that took place in Russia between 
August 1995 and December 2003 consists of 194 electoral events.
4 Data on most policy 
instruments and outcomes are available for 159 elections between September 1996 and July 
2003. Four regions had three rounds of elections, sixty-five regions had two rounds of elections, 
                                                 
4 This list covers all the regions but Dagestan, the only region where there have not been any governor elections. We 
excluded Chechnya and Ingushetia from the sample because fluctuations in fiscal policies of these regions have been 
driven by war rather than elections. 
  6and seventeen regions had just one round of elections during this period. The source of the data 
on elections is Tsentrizbirkom, the Central Elections Committee of the Russian Federation.  
Regional monthly series of fiscal instruments and outcomes come from two sources: 
Goskomstat, the State Committee of Statistics, provided data on wages and income, wage arrears 
from the regional budgets, price level, and industrial output between 1995 and 2003; the Ministry 
of Finance of the Russian Federation provided detailed data on the execution of regional budgets 
for the period between 1996 and 2003.  
To test for the determinants of cycle magnitude, we use cross-section data. Data on 
urbanization and education come from Goskomstat. The data on freedom of media in the regions 
were provided by the Institute of Free Media (www.freepress.ru). Data on transparency of the 
regional government come from “Media-Soyuz,” an independent professional association of 
Russian journalists. Data on the scope of regional democracy are from the Carnegie Moscow 
Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Petrov 2001). The appendix presents 
descriptive statistics of the data.  
IV. RESULTS 
IV.A. Test for Opportunistic Cycles 
Three groups of policy instruments and outcomes are considered: budgetary expenditures 
(total spending as well as levels and shares of expenditures on social programs, education, 
culture, healthcare, mass media, and industrial subsidies), budget revenues and deficit (total 
revenues, tax revenues, deficit, and federal transfers) and such outcomes as growth, inflation, 
regional budgetary wage arrears, wage level, and income. We test for political cycles in these 
  7variables treating election time as exogenous.
5 The following equation is estimated on regional 
monthly panel data: 
(1)          , 
{}
it is t it it it
j
jit j it f Left Term y L m y ε τ γ γ β α + + + + + + = −
− ∈∑ 2 1 1
12 ; 12
) (
where  i  identifies regions; t–real time in months. y  stands for a logarithm of instrument or 
outcome of regional policy (all monetary variables are expressed in real terms per capita). To 
control for the federal trend and macroeconomic shocks, we include the complete set of time 
fixed effects  t τ –one for each month t. To control for region-specific fixed effects and region-
specific seasonality, we include fixed effects   for each of the 12 calendar months   in each 
region i. Results are robust to using alternative methods of accounting for seasonality and trend 
(Alesina and Roubini 1992).  
is f ) (t s
mjit is a dummy that equals 1, if t is j months away from elections (j=0 in the month of 
elections; negative j means that t is before and positive–that t is after the election month). 
Henceforth, we refer to the mjits as cycle dummies. Positive estimates of αj before and negative 
estimates of αj after elections serve as evidence of opportunistic political cycles. 
Lag polynomial  1 ) ( − it y L β  accounts for autocorrelation in y. We tested for optimal lag 
structure using Akaike criterion. Four lags turned out to be optimal for the vast majority of the 
series. For the sake of uniformity, we report regressions with four lags for all the series, but 
results do not change if we include optimal number of lags separately for each series. Lags in 
panel regressions with fixed effects produce biases that converge to zero when the time 
                                                 
5 Ito [1990], Reid [1998], and Heckelman and Berument [1998] among others pointed out that opportunistic cycles 
can occur as a result of setting election date at a time of a boom. Although almost 19 percent of Russia’s regional 
elections happened a month or more of their expected date; in vast majority of these cases, the time was shifted for 
exogenous reasons. There were few cases, however, when there was no exogenous reason for the shift of election 
time even though it is illegal to shift the date of regional elections. To make sure that our results are not driven by 
presence of endogenous elections, we repeated all tests on the subsample of elections that had exogenously pre-
determined timing and got virtually identical results. 
  8dimension of a panel goes to infinity (Nickell 1981, Hansen 1982, and White 1982). Our panel 
covers more than eighty months; therefore, asymptotic properties apply. Nonetheless, we verified 
that results are robust to using the Arellano-Bond procedure (Arellano and Bond 1991).
6 
Term controls for incumbent’s political horizon that can be an important determinant of 
fiscal policies (Besley and Case 1995). It equals 0, 1, 2, or 3 depending on the term that the 
incumbent serves in office: 0 means that the governor is appointed and has not been elected 
before; 1 indicates that he was elected for the first time, etc. Left is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
incumbent governor is supported by the Communist coalition. It controls for partisan cycles.
7 
The results of estimation of equation (1) are presented in Tables I and II. Figure II plots 
the predicted political budget cycle measured in percentage deviations from trend around 
elections. Total budget expenditures experience the first significant jump up of 7 percent nine 
months before elections.
8 After that there are no significant changes until one month before 
elections when expenditures rise significantly by 13 percent. The cumulative increase in budget 
spending during the year prior to elections amounts to 18 percent (five percent of monthly 
regional product). The election month and two months right after elections are characterized by a 
significant fall in budget expenditures of 17 percent. Spending on education, culture, and 
healthcare exhibit significant increases during the two months prior to elections of 14 percent on 
                                                 
6 We tested for residual autocorrelation in the panel (1). The results showed that the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation in residuals cannot be rejected for all dependent variables. p-values for this test are presented in the 
Appendix. The null cannot be rejected for each dependent variable at 5 percent significance level and for each 
dependent variable but wages at 25 percent significance level. In addition, we tested for unit roots in each series for 
each region using augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected for all series in all 
regions with the exception of wage arrears. Thus, we run regression (1) for the log change rather than level of wage 
arrears because growth of wage arrears is stationary. 
7 Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen [1997] review the partisan theory and evidence. Electoral campaign platforms of 
Russia’s governors are polarized into the “communist left” and the “liberal-democratic ideology.” In practice, the 
variation in the data is insufficient to have a proper test of partisan theory because there are only few cases when a 
new governor of the opposite ideological platform replaced an incumbent; therefore, ideology is almost perfectly 
collinear with fixed effects. Thus, we do not put emphasis on interpretation of coefficients of the “left-wing” 
dummy. 
8 Henceforth, the changes in expenditures are calculated by comparisons of fitted values net of the federal trend and 
seasonality (see Figure II for the illustration). This is because the estimates of coefficients of the 25 cycle dummies 
indicate the shift in the underlying autoregressive process rather than the shift in expenditures themselves. 
  9average and significant decreases during the two months after elections of about 18 percent. 
Social expenditures rise five and one month before elections by 9 and 24 percent, respectively, 
reaching the level of 31 percent above the trend. In the two months after elections, social 
expenditures come back to the trend level.
9 Cycles in public expenditure are supported by 
intensive use of mass media. Media spending increases by 23 percent during half a year 
preceding elections and drops by 32 percent in the month of elections and two post-electoral 
months.
10 We also find significant budget composition effects of elections: the share of social 
expenditures in total spending rises by 14 percent and the share of media expenditures by 23 
percent during a half a year preceding elections. In the pre-electoral month, shares of spending 
on social programs and media reach the levels that are 14 and 19 percent higher than their levels 
in the middle of the term. 
Table II presents the effect of elections on budget revenues, growth, inflation, income, 
and wage arrears growth. Repayments of wage arrears to public workers exhibit strong cyclical 
pattern. Regression results for the growth of wage arrears imply the following level dynamics: 
Wage arrears drop by 32 percent in the three pre-election months. The cumulative decline in 
                                                 
9 We verified that standard errors of electoral dummies are estimated consistently in the dynamic panel (1) and that 
the results are not driven by a specific seasonal structure of elections in our sample. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan [2004], we conduct a series of estimations of the effect of randomly generated placebo elections (with 
and without holding their seasonal structure equal to the seasonal structure of the actual elections) on total and social 
regional expenditures. Significant cycles (i.e., increases in budget spending before elections and decreases–after) 
were found in less then one percent of the cases. 
10 To understand the kinds of publicity associated with budget cycle, we read local newspapers and press releases of 
regional authorities in a few regions. For a half a year before elections, most local newspapers actively praise 
incumbent governors. When few months are still left before elections, they report promises to pay out arrears in 
wages and child benefits in the near future (see, for instance, “SeverInform” [Oct 21 1999] for elections in Kirov 
Oblast in Mar 2000 and “Agenstvo Informatsii Udmurtii” [Mar 24 2000] for elections in Udmurtiya in Oct 2000). 
Right before elections articles usually claim that all arrears are paid off (see “Krasnoyarsky Rabochy” [Aug 20 
2002] for elections in Krasnoyarsky Krai in Sep 2002; Press Release of Tomsk Oblast Administration [Aug 10 1999] 
for elections in Tomsk Oblast in Sep 1999). Occasionally, one comes across articles in the federal press that criticize 
incumbent governors and point to sources of funds used for repayment of arrears (e.g., “Kommersant” [Mar 24 
2000] for elections in Pskovskaya Oblast in Nov 2000). The cycle in publicity around governors is vivid: we 
counted the number of press releases that were issued by administration of Sverdlovskaya Oblast. On average, 
controlling for trend and seasonality, the number of press releases in the four months before elections is 40 percent 
higher than throughout the electoral term. 
  10wage arrears during the nine months before elections amounts to 42 percent. For a half a year 
after elections, wage arrears gradually rise but do not reach their initial level. The pre-electoral 
rise in public spending is financed in part by increases in non-tax and tax revenues, in part by an 
increase in deficit and in part by increased federal transfers (in regions-recipients of federal 
transfers). Budget cycle, and in particular, sizable fluctuations in government wage arrears and 
social spending drive dynamics of wages and income. During the four months prior to elections, 
wages and income rise significantly reaching the levels 5 and 1 percent above the trend, 
respectively, and return to the trend level in the three subsequent months. 
Regional growth does not have a cyclical pattern. Inflation significantly decreases for 
half a year prior to elections and gradually (insignificantly) rises for half a year after elections.
11 
Therefore, contrary to Nordhaus’s prediction, politicians do not explore growth-inflation tradeoff 
to increase their chances of reelection.
12 
Budget cycles are short-lived: the largest shifts in expenditures occur within a month or 
two from the election date. The use of quarterly and annual data by the previous literature most 
likely led to underestimation of cycles because the opposite-sign shifts in fiscal policies around 
elections cancel out in the data with low frequency. To illustrate this point we collapsed monthly 
series at the quarterly level and estimated equation analogous to (1) on quarterly data. First, 
statistical significance in quarterly panel is reduced: few expenditure items show significant 
fluctuations around elections. Second, the magnitude of these fluctuations is considerably 
smaller. Figure III presents cycles estimated with monthly and quarterly data. For the vast 
                                                 
11 The fall in inflation before elections is much smaller in magnitude than fluctuations in fiscal policies or wages and 
income. Thus, our results hold irrespective of whether we take real or nominal variables. As a baseline, we report 
dynamics of real spending and income; the results remain the same when we test for cycles in nominal expenditures 
and income disregarding the price differences between regions. 
12 Keller and May [1984] were the first to argue that one needs to look at the political actions rather than the real 
economic outcomes to find evidence of opportunistic cycles based on analysis of President Nixon’s election 
campaign. Drazen [2000] surveyed empirical literature to show that models with adaptive expectations à la 
Nordhaus [1975] are inconsistent with results of virtually all empirical tests: cycles if found affect fiscal and 
monetary policies rather than growth or unemployment. 
  11majority of expenditure items, deviation from the trend near elections predicted using quarterly 
data is less than one third of the one predicted by monthly panel. 
Overall, we find very strong evidence of sizable opportunistic cycles in fiscal policies and 
no evidence of cycles in economic growth. The most vivid increases in budget spending occur a 
month or two before elections. This implies that instruments of pre-electoral manipulation are 
observed by voters almost immediately. This could be achieved only with direct monetary 
payments to voters. Indeed, the two main instruments are repayment of wage arrears and social 
expenditures comprised of welfare, child benefits, veteran allowances, social insurance, and 
other public assistance programs. Our analysis of local and federal newspapers and regional 
governments’ press releases provides numerous anecdotes suggesting that cycles in total, 
healthcare, education, and cultural spending also reflect manipulation with compensation of 
medical workers, teachers, and other government employees. Government wage bill is 
sufficiently large to show cycles in aggregate spending. For instance, in education and healthcare 
spending, it takes up about two thirds of the total. Therefore, we observe the shift of public 
expenditure (both over time and across items) towards the most visible to voters as predicted by 
the Rogoff’s model [1990].
13 
IV.B. Determinants of Opportunistic Cycles 
Methodologically, the best way to test for the determinants of cycle magnitude is to run 
specification (1) with additional regressors: proxies for possible determinants of the cycle and 
their interaction with the cycle dummies  . The following potential determinants are 
considered: level of democracy (measured by a regional democracy index), voter awareness 
jit m
                                                 
13 A shift of expenditure towards more visible items was also found by Block [2003]. Using an annual panel of 
developing countries, he found that budget composition shifted away from public investment towards current 
consumption in the face of elections. In contrast, Khemani [2000] and Gonzalez [2002] find significant pre-electoral 
increases in public investment in Mexico and India. Khemani, however, shows that it is the road construction–the 
most visible type of investment–that is cyclical. 
  12(measured by logs of regional shares of population with higher education and of urban 
population), and transparency (measured by region-level indices of media freedom and 
government transparency), all of which are positively correlated. These measures are available 
only as cross-section; we denote them by Ri. Proxies for voter awareness reflect both the 
possibilities of electorate to get access to information (i.e., internet and TV) which is easier in 
urban areas and the ability of electorate to process this information that comes with education. 
We also test how cycle magnitude changes with time. For ease of interpretation of coefficients, 
we rescale time to be measured in years (Time=t/12). As discussed below, Time
 is a proxy for 
voter learning and development of independent media and civil society since the country’s 
democratization, but it could also reflect increased federal control over Russian regions under 
Putin’s compared to Yeltsin’s presidency. For presentation purposes, we report results of 
estimation of the short specification (1`) that preserves the main results of estimating 
specification with the full set of 25 cycle dummies. 
(1`)       
{} {} {}








jit j it f Left Term y L Time Time m R m m y ε τ γ γ β ξ ξ η α + + + + + + + + + = −
− ∈ − ∈ − ∈ ∑ ∑ ∑ 2 1 1
0 ; 3 0 ; 3 3 ; 3
) ( . 
Here we look only at budgetary expenditures that exhibit cyclical dynamics. Superscript D 
indicates that we subtract means from R and Time  before taking cross-terms; in this case, 
coefficient of the respective m is equal to the full effect evaluated at the mean values of R and 
Time. Negative significant coefficients at   and   (given that coefficients at 
respective   are positive) serve as evidence that R and Time decrease the cycle magnitude. 
i jitR m t jitTime m
jit m
Table III presents results of estimation of equation (1`) for social expenditures and 
expenditures on culture. Results for the total budget expenditures and revenues, share of social 
expenditures, and spending on healthcare and education are very similar. There are no results for 
media spending and industrial subsidies. The interaction terms of voter awareness, democracy, 
  13transparency and time with cycle dummies two months before elections usually have negative 
and often significant coefficients. Thus, these variables reduce the magnitude of the cycle. For 
instance, the results imply that a one standard deviation increase in our measures of education, 
urbanization, democracy, government transparency, and media freedom leads to a significant 
reduction in the jump of social expenditures prior to elections of  7, 9, 10, 7, and 8 percentage 
points, respectively. 
The fact that Ri does not vary across time and for two of the five measures (viz., 
education and urbanization) varies only a little across regions potentially creates a problem in 
estimation of this panel because regressors   and   are correlated. To make sure that our 
results are not driven by this correlation we carry out a cross-section test. We construct the 
following measure of cycle magnitude: The cycle amplitude in a particular policy instrument for 
a particular election is defined as the residual corresponding to the last month before the election 
from estimation of the following equation run separately for each region and each instrument: 
i jitR m jit m








1 ) ( . 
sjt stands for dummies corresponding to 12 calendar months. t is the real time.  1 ) ( − it y L β  is the lag 
polynomial of the same order as in (1). Summary statistics for constructed amplitudes are 
presented in Table IV. For all fiscal policy instruments, mean amplitudes are positive and, for 
eight out of nine, they are significantly different from zero. In addition, we constructed an 
aggregate measure of the magnitude of the political budget cycle as the first principal component 
of the amplitudes in individual fiscal policies with the most profound cycle. To test for the 
determinants of the cycle, we run the following equation on the pooled cross section of elections: 
(3)        i i i i i i Duration Budget Time R A ε β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 , 
  14where i is the ordinal number of elections. Ai is a measure of cycle amplitude. As above, Ri is a 
proxy for awareness, democracy, and transparency, and Timei–real time measured in years.
14 
Richer regions may have higher financial slack for manipulation of fiscal policies because the 
necessary fixed expenditure takes up a smaller part of the whole budget. We control for this 
effect with the regional mean of the size of per capita budget over the whole period– .
15 
Persson and Tabellini [2003] show that differences in electoral rules explain a part of cross-
country variation in political cycles. Generally, regional electoral rules in Russia are uniform. 
There are potentially significant differences only in the duration of governor's electoral term that 
varies from 4 to 5 years with the exception of one region with a seven-year term. The duration of 
term may affect “ego-rents” (Rogoff 1990) increasing the politicians’ incentives for cycles or 
may reflect the fact that incumbent had more time for getting rid of political opposition 
decreasing the need for cycle. We use dummy indicating regions with the term above four years 
as a control (Durationi).
16  
i Budget
Table V presents results of estimation of equation (3). Cross-section test confirms 
findings from the panel regressions. Voter awareness, democracy, transparency, and time reduce 
cycles. In all regressions, coefficients of these measures are negative and in more than two 
                                                 
14 In cross-section regressions, instead of the entire index of democracy, we use dummy that indicates if a region has 
a value of democracy that is above the median (this proxy gives us better fit, possibly because of poor cardinal 
properties of the index). In estimation of equation (3), we excluded elections that took place in nine Autonomous 
Okrugs that are subdivisions of other larger regions because for the most part R data are unavailable for them, 
elections with a single candidate, and elections in which an incumbent did not run for reelection and did not name 
his successor. Equation (3) has regional-level regressors; thus, we allow error terms to be clustered within regions. 
15 Including Term as a control in cross-section regressions does not change any of the results. It is highly correlated 
with Time; when both are included as regressors, Term comes out insignificant, but the effect of Time does not 
change. The cycle magnitude could also be affected by world oil price because in times of high oil prices governors 
may be less constrained in pre-electoral fiscal manipulations. A large chunk of budgetary revenues at all levels of 
government depends on taxation of oil rents. As a robustness check, we have controlled for the oil price and oil 
revenues in all regressions and for their interaction with the cycle dummies in panel regressions and found that none 
of our baseline results are driven by the dynamics of oil prices. 
16 There is one other difference in electoral rules across regions: Vast majority of regions have two round elections, 
i.e., a runoff follows the first round in the case when none of the candidates receive more than a half of the votes; a 
few regions, however, have single-round elections. The number of single-round elections is insufficient to test its 
influence on cycles. Controlling for the number of rounds does not have any effect on the results. 
  15thirds–significant. A 10 percent increase in the share of educated population decreases cycle 
amplitude in education, cultural, and healthcare expenditures by about 2 percentage points. A 10 
percent increase in urbanization leads to a decrease in cycles in total, healthcare, and cultural 
spending of 2 and in social spending of 5 percentage points. The difference in magnitudes of 
cycles in total, social, cultural, and healthcare spending between regions with democracy above 
and below the median is about ten percentage points. A standard deviation increase in the index 
of government transparency leads to a decrease of cycles in social and total spending of 9 and 3 
percentage points while a standard deviation increase in the media freedom index leads to a 
decrease in cycles in social and cultural expenditure of 8 and 6 percentage points. The first 
principal component of cycle amplitudes is significantly affected by all the measures. 
Panel and cross-section results show that time negatively affects the size of the budget 
cycle. As shown in Table V, cycles fade away relatively fast: each additional year on average 
decreases cycle magnitude by about 3 percentage points. We also estimated the effect of the 
number of previous elections as was done by Block, Ferree, and Singh [2003]: An additional 
election in a region significantly reduces the cycle amplitude by 6 to 16 percent depending on the 
expenditure item considered. We consider two possible interpretations of the negative influence 
of time on the magnitude of the cycle: the emergence of civil society and learning by voters as 
democracy matures, and the disciplining role of increased central control over regions during 
Putin’s compared to Yeltsin’s administration. Although, there were no formal changes in 
electoral rules or authority of regional governments over spending from Yeltsin’s to Putin’s time, 
one could argue that Putin has monitored regional governments more closely than Yeltsin and 
increasingly closely throughout his term. In an attempt to separate the two hypotheses, we repeat 
the analysis separately for the two time periods when each of the presidents was in power. In 
each subsample, budget cycle is significant. The difference in magnitude of the cycle between 
  16the two subsamples is 2.5 times. Under Putin, the effect of time on the cycle is negative but for 
the majority of expenditure items insignificant; under Yeltsin, it is essentially zero. Thus, most of 
the variation in the cycle magnitude over time comes from comparison of the two waves of 
elections that took place under different presidents. We cannot rule out the voter learning 
explanation of the effect of time, however, because insignificance of time within subsamples 
could be attributed to the reduction in the number of observations or clustering of election 
dates.
17 
IV.C. Do Cycles Help Wining? 
To test whether cycles helped incumbent governors to get reelected, we estimate how the 
share of votes for incumbent and the probability to win depend on the cycle magnitude 
controlling for an incumbent’s ideology, performance in the last term, and differences in 
electoral rules. The following equation is estimated on the pooled cross section of elections: 




i i i Duration Perform Urban Left Time Time A A P ε γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ + + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Pi is the popularity of incumbent measured by the ratio of votes for the incumbent to the 
sum of votes for the incumbent and the most popular challenger. A (cycle amplitude), Time, Left, 
and Duration are described above. Again, we subtract means before taking the cross-term to 
make interpretation of  1 γ  easier. Positive coefficient at A is an indication that cycles are 
associated with an increase in incumbents’ popularity; negative coefficient at the cross-term 
indicates that this relationship weakens over time. We control for the incumbent’s past 
performance (Perform) which can be important in the case of retrospective voting (Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1995). In reported regressions, we control for the relative share of social expenditures, 
relative per capita regional industrial product and relative inflation measured as net-of-federal-
                                                 
17 Clustering of election dates is particularly severe during Yeltsin’s time: 53 percent of governor elections covered 
by our sample during Yeltsin’s presidency occurred within four months of each other. In the Putin’s subsample, 
elections are more spread out over time. 
  17trend means over the last term relative to the overall regional means net of federal trend. We 
verified that the main results do not depend on presence or the choice of proxies for past 
performance. In particular, we also controlled for relative income, relative taxation level, relative 
total public spending, as well as relative growth rates in all of these performance indicators. We 
also control for the regional share of urban population, Urban, which has a very strong direct 
effect on popularity. Cook’s distance (Cook 1977) and DFITS statistic (Belsley, Kuh, and 
Welsch 1980) indicate that two observations have excessively strong effect on the estimates 
(these are elections with very popular incumbents); we exclude them from the sample.
18 In 
addition to OLS regressions for incumbents’ popularity, we estimate similar binary and ordered 
probit regressions with the following outcomes for an incumbent: wins/losses and wins/is the 
first runner up/is below the second place. 
There is an endogeneity problem in these regressions. If an incumbent is certain about the 
results of an upcoming election because he is either extremely popular or extremely unpopular, 
he has little incentive for pre-electoral manipulations. The tighter the electoral competition, the 
higher the cycle. OLS underestimates the causal relationship between cycles and popularity 
when incumbents are confident of reelection and overestimates when incumbents are sure of 
losing. We do not have a good instrument for the cycle amplitude because all variables that 
sufficiently strongly correlate with it have an independent-of-the-cycles effect on the popularity 
of incumbents. In the vast majority of cases, however, incumbents were the most popular 
candidates to win the next election, and therefore, overall we are likely to underestimate the 
effect. To make sure that we do not overestimate the effect of cycles on popularity, we re-run the 
regressions on the subsample of elections in which incumbent was at least as popular as the main 
                                                 
18 As above, we exclude from the sample elections with a single candidate, elections in which an incumbent did not 
run for reelection and did not name his successor, and elections in nine Autonomous Okrugs. Error terms are allowed 
to cluster within regions. 
  18opponent (for OLS) and on the subsample where the opponent is at most 1.3 times as popular as 
the incumbent (for OLS and probits) and got very similar results. 
Table VI presents the results. Cycles in social, healthcare, education, and cultural 
spending generate significant political benefits for incumbent governors while pre-electoral 
expansion of total spending has no effect. A one standard deviation increase in the cycle 
amplitude in social, education, and cultural expenditures leads to growth in incumbents’ 
popularity of 4, 5, and 5 percentage points, respectively. In the table we report coefficients of the 
ordered probit regressions which translate into the following marginal effects: A one standard 
deviation increase in the cycle in social and education spending leads to an increase in the 
probability of incumbent’s win of about 10 and 13 percentage points, respectively. Binary probit 
results are analogous. We do not find any significant weakening of political benefits of cycles 
over time: in all regressions, the coefficient of the interaction term of time and cycle magnitude 
is insignificant. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We tested for existence of opportunistic political cycles and studied whether voter 
awareness, democracy, transparency, and time affect cycles. We also examined if cycles increase 
governors’ chances of reelection. The monthly regional panel data allowed us to define timing of 
the cycle more precisely than it has been previously done in the literature. The key findings are 
as follows. 1) We find significant political cycles in budget spending and its composition. The 
average pre-electoral increase in total regional expenditure amounts to about five percent of 
monthly gross regional product and in welfare and other public assistance programs to 0.43 
percent of monthly gross regional product. Consistent with Rogoff [1990], we observe a shift of 
public spending towards direct monetary payments to voters. 2) Previous studies likely 
  19underestimated the budget cycle because quarterly frequency of the data is insufficient to 
measure the cycle precisely. The underestimation is particularly strong when cycles are short-
lived. Most sizable manipulations in our sample occur within a month or two away from an 
election date. We show that use of quarterly as opposed to monthly data results in estimates that 
are one third of the actual deviations from the trend around elections. 3) The magnitude of the 
cycle decreases with education, urbanization, level of democracy, transparency of the 
government, and freedom of media. Thus, information symmetry and development of democratic 
institutions are important factors influencing cycles. 4) Cycles have become smaller over time. 
This is consistent with the view that voters and independent media learn as democracy matures, 
but could also be explained by a change in Russia-specific institutional factors. 5) The scale of 
pre-electoral manipulations increases the popularity of incumbent governors and probability to 
get reelected. 
We show that maturity of democracy is an important factor determining the scope for 
effective use of political cycles: Cycles are smaller in more democratic regions. This result 
contrasts with the finding of Gonzalez [2002] that Mexican political cycles got stronger with 
democratization. The evidence suggests that, unlike in Mexico during the PRI domination, 
democracy in Russia in 1996-2003 reached the point where enforcement of political turnover at 
the regional level was not prohibitively costly and in some regions, it even gave rise to an 
embryo of free press and institutions of civil society allowing voters to get information about 
politicians in a less costly way than by means of political cycles. 
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month –12 -0.034 -0.018 -0.001 0.007 -0.013 0.019 0.003 0.045 0.070
(0.026) (0.043) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028) (0.059) (0.111) (0.040) (0.056)
month –11 0.000 0.003 -0.038 -0.051 -0.013 0.013 0.081 -0.007 -0.002
(0.026) (0.041) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.057) (0.106) (0.039) (0.054)
month –10 -0.013 0.028 0.011 -0.011 0.019 0.033 0.012 0.029 0.026
(0.026) (0.041) (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.055) (0.105) (0.039) (0.053)
month -9 0.047* 0.053 0.027 0.037 0.017 0.077 0.188* 0.004 0.011
(0.026) (0.041) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.055) (0.107) (0.039) (0.053)
month -8 0.015 0.041 0.001 0.005 0.027 0.036 0.122 0.064 0.013
(0.026) (0.041) (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.055) (0.104) (0.039) (0.054)
month -7 0.020 -0.044 -0.015 -0.033 0.003 -0.034 -0.028 -0.020 -0.047
(0.025) (0.039) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.055) (0.098) (0.039) (0.053)
month -6 0.007 -0.026 0.031 0.028 0.022 0.002 0.125 -0.011 0.008
(0.025) (0.039) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.055) (0.100) (0.038) (0.051)
month -5 0.025 0.074* 0.033 0.006 0.003 0.062 -0.114 0.016 0.011
(0.025) (0.038) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.055) (0.099) (0.038) (0.051)
month -4 0.009 0.059 -0.046* -0.020 -0.041 0.081 -0.122 0.038 0.088*
(0.026) (0.040) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.057) (0.105) (0.040) (0.054)
month -3 0.024 0.038 0.001 -0.001 0.010 0.032 -0.096 -0.001 0.018
(0.025) (0.040) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.056) (0.105) (0.038) (0.052)
month -2 -0.001 0.030 0.031 0.020 0.045* 0.170*** 0.017 0.049 0.159***
(0.025) (0.040) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.055) (0.105) (0.038) (0.052)
month -1 0.117*** 0.226*** 0.121*** 0.140*** 0.130*** 0.106* 0.200* 0.103*** -0.049
(0.025) (0.040) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.054) (0.105) (0.037) (0.051)
month 0: elections -0.053** 0.030 -0.077*** -0.061** -0.081*** -0.127** -0.008 0.080** -0.091*
(0.026) (0.041) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.057) (0.107) (0.039) (0.053)
month +1 -0.046* -0.092** -0.039* -0.116*** -0.031 -0.164*** -0.147 -0.042 -0.122**
(0.024) (0.038) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.053) (0.099) (0.036) (0.049)
month +2 -0.043* -0.062 -0.016 -0.034 -0.019 -0.170*** -0.095 -0.031 -0.140***
(0.024) (0.038) (0.023) (0.028) (0.025) (0.052) (0.098) (0.035) (0.049)
month +3 0.004 0.016 -0.005 -0.037 0.006 0.004 0.029 0.028 -0.014
(0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.052) (0.097) (0.035) (0.049)
month +4 -0.005 -0.006 0.022 -0.007 0.038 0.060 0.108 -0.011 0.050
(0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.028) (0.025) (0.052) (0.096) (0.035) (0.048)
month +5 0.011 0.019 0.022 0.013 0.012 0.046 -0.039 0.009 0.038
(0.023) (0.037) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.051) (0.092) (0.035) (0.048)
month +6 -0.007 0.061* 0.033 -0.005 -0.019 -0.002 0.211** 0.067* -0.016
(0.023) (0.037) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.051) (0.094) (0.035) (0.049)
month +7 0.039* -0.012 0.013 0.014 0.020 0.086* -0.147 -0.053 0.033
(0.023) (0.037) (0.022) (0.028) (0.024) (0.052) (0.095) (0.036) (0.049)
month +8 0.019 0.014 -0.007 0.026 0.002 0.015 -0.022 0.007 -0.006
(0.024) (0.038) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.052) (0.097) (0.036) (0.049)
month +9 -0.018 -0.005 0.031 -0.010 0.012 0.047 -0.056 0.023 0.065
(0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.052) (0.097) (0.036) (0.049)
month +10 -0.009 -0.002 0.007 0.040 -0.004 -0.036 0.017 0.008 -0.013
(0.023) (0.038) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.052) (0.098) (0.035) (0.049)
month +11 0.042* 0.016 0.023 0.075*** 0.031 0.004 -0.018 -0.007 -0.015
(0.023) (0.038) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.051) (0.100) (0.035) (0.048)
month +12 -0.004 -0.016 0.015 0.004 -0.019 0.024 0.059 -0.003 0.050
(0.024) (0.039) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.054) (0.102) (0.036) (0.050)
Term in power -0.012 -0.006 -0.010 -0.017 -0.001 -0.026 -0.037 -0.002 -0.028
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.022) (0.041) (0.015) (0.021)
Left 0.030 -0.003 0.028 -0.001 0.005 -0.073 -0.011 -0.009 -0.101
(0.034) (0.048) (0.028) (0.036) (0.031) (0.077) (0.122) (0.052) (0.070)
Obs. 6767 7004 6989 6921 6966 6600 5825 6388 6241
R
2 0.574 0.561 0.548 0.481 0.511 0.235 0.611 0.349 0.131  
All regressions include four lags, full set of time dummies, and fixed effects for each region-calendar month 
combination. All dependent variables are in logs and measured in real terms per capita. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Regression for federal transfers is 
run on subsample where regions received strictly positive federal aid. 
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month –12 0.039 0.017 -0.053** -0.057 0.007 -0.006** 0.003 0.003 -0.060
(0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.085) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.071)
month –11 0.003 -0.008 -0.019 0.012 -0.006 -0.007*** -0.011** 0.003 0.063
(0.027) (0.023) (0.020) (0.081) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.064)
month –10 -0.038 -0.046** 0.009 0.055 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.022
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.078) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.063)
month -9 0.019 0.036 0.011 0.161** -0.005 -0.007*** 0.010* -0.004 0.084*
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.075) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.051)
month -8 0.014 0.028 0.002 0.094 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.067
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.075) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.050)
month -7 -0.014 -0.023 0.017 -0.101 0.024* 0.000 0.004 -0.003 -0.056
(0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.075) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.047)
month -6 -0.014 0.016 0.028 -0.062 0.010 -0.001 -0.005 -0.008 0.046
(0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.074) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.047)
month -5 0.036 0.053** -0.014 0.053 0.005 0.002 -0.013*** -0.006 -0.217***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.075) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.047)
month -4 -0.014 -0.004 0.000 -0.137* -0.003 -0.004 0.008 0.002 0.023
(0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.081) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.055)
month -3 0.008 0.035 0.042** -0.036 0.016 -0.007*** 0.008 0.014** 0.052
(0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.078) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.058)
month -2 0.008 0.027 0.003 -0.072 0.007 -0.002 0.005 0.018*** -0.012
(0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.078) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.060)
month -1 0.080*** 0.000 0.052*** 0.145* -0.013 -0.005** 0.017*** 0.036*** -0.207***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.019) (0.079) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.066)
month 0: elections -0.050* -0.024 0.010 -0.148* 0.000 -0.005* 0.006 0.006 -0.073
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.084) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.064)
month +1 -0.063** -0.008 -0.007 -0.035 -0.009 0.001 -0.012** -0.022*** 0.043
(0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.080) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.059)
month +2 -0.032 -0.047** -0.009 0.042 -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.028*** 0.057
(0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.077) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.056)
month +3 0.010 -0.001 0.000 0.028 0.012 0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.098*
(0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.078) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.052)
month +4 -0.005 0.015 0.029 -0.170** 0.004 0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.024
(0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.079) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.050)
month +5 -0.023 -0.013 0.020 -0.138* 0.016 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.050
(0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.079) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.048)
month +6 -0.012 0.009 0.013 0.055 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 0.055
(0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.079) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.048)
month +7 0.038 0.060*** -0.015 0.018 0.007 -0.002 -0.013** 0.003 -0.114**
(0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.077) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.049)
month +8 0.005 -0.004 0.005 0.031 -0.022 -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.044
(0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.076) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.051)
month +9 -0.009 -0.021 -0.014 -0.024 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.064
(0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.076) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.052)
month +10 -0.028 -0.018 0.011 -0.055 -0.013 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.015
(0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.076) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.057)
month +11 0.055** 0.008 -0.004 -0.125* -0.009 0.005* -0.006 -0.009 -0.101*
(0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.074) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.061)
month +12 -0.008 0.020 -0.005 -0.087 -0.018 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.066
(0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.075) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.072)
Term in power -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.029 0.005 -0.004*** 0.001 0.003 0.013
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.033) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.024)
Left 0.025 0.071*** -0.038 0.227 -0.009 -0.001 -0.003 -0.012* 0.000
(0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.160) (0.012) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000)
Obs. 6498 7060 5916 4115 6946 10731 7970 8002 2823
R
2 0.656 0.584 0.334 0.631 0.351 0.818 0.928 0.851 0.864  
All regressions include four lags, full set of time dummies, and fixed effects for each region-calendar month 
combination. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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R * Month -3 0.092 -0.107 0.121 0.051 -0.035 0.003 -0.048 0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.019 0.000
(0.155) (0.115) (0.136) (0.106) (0.042) (0.032) (0.039) (0.030) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.013)
R * Month -2 -0.263* -0.154 -0.031 -0.086 -0.002 0.001 -0.020 -0.028 -0.006** -0.004* -0.025 -0.031**
(0.160) (0.120) (0.145) (0.114) (0.043) (0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.013)
R * Month -1 -0.081 -0.232** -0.312** -0.014 -0.076* -0.034 -0.089** -0.014 -0.007** -0.002 -0.063***-0.032**
(0.145) (0.109) (0.141) (0.111) (0.043) (0.033) (0.039) (0.030) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.013)
R * Month 0 -0.085 -0.193* 0.060 -0.073 0.008 0.016 0.038 0.015 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.012
(0.145) (0.108) (0.143) (0.106) (0.043) (0.033) (0.039) (0.030) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.013)
Month -3 0.022 -0.002 0.033 0.002 0.025 0.008 0.027 0.008 0.029 0.002 0.035 0.006
(0.037) (0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.038) (0.028) (0.038) (0.028) (0.038) (0.028) (0.039) (0.029)
Month -2 0.024 0.012 0.028 0.011 0.026 0.012 0.028 0.012 0.027 0.014 0.026 0.003
(0.037) (0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029) (0.039) (0.029)
Month -1 0.223*** 0.127*** 0.227*** 0.121*** 0.216*** 0.121*** 0.218*** 0.121*** 0.227*** 0.126*** 0.197*** 0.107***
(0.037) (0.028) (0.038) (0.029) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.038) (0.028) (0.039) (0.029)
Month 0 0.038 -0.067** 0.036 -0.063** 0.035 -0.066** 0.036 -0.065** 0.036 -0.067** 0.040 -0.059**
(0.037) (0.028) (0.038) (0.029) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.038) (0.029)
Month +1 -0.097***-0.115*** -0.094**-0.110*** -0.102***-0.106*** -0.101***-0.106*** -0.107***-0.108*** -0.090**-0.108***
(0.037) (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028)
Month +2 -0.069* -0.034 -0.069* -0.034 -0.069* -0.025 -0.069* -0.025 -0.071* -0.022 -0.069* -0.034
(0.037) (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028)
Month +3 0.003 -0.052* 0.005 -0.045 0.011 -0.051* 0.010 -0.051* 0.001 -0.045 0.005 -0.046
(0.037) (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028)
Left -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001
(0.045) (0.034) (0.048) (0.036) (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) (0.035) (0.047) (0.035)
Term in power -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.016 -0.007 -0.010
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Time 0.058*** 0.041***
(0.010) (0.007)
Observations 6410 6356 7004 6921 6593 6563 6593 6563 6671 6632 7004 6921
Number of regions 76 76 86 86 80 80 80 80 81 81 86 86
R-squared 0.596 0.497 0.560 0.479 0.584 0.479 0.584 0.479 0.581 0.482 0.561 0.480
Media freedom Time Education Urbanization Democracy Transparency
 
All regressions include four lags, full set of time dummies, and fixed effects for each region-calendar month combination. All dependent variables are in logs and 
measured in real terms per capita. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. The results 
are robust to the number of pre-electoral dummies included and to accounting for R and Time influence jointly or in separate specifications.
26 TABLE IV 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE CONSTRUCTED MEASURES OF THE 
AMPLITUDE OF THE CYCLES 
Obs. Mean Median S.E. Min Max
Amplitude of the cycle in:
Total budget expenditures 132 0.075 * 0.073 0.018 -0.713 0.653
Social expenditures 136 0.158 * 0.100 0.030 -0.624 1.442
Education expenditures 136 0.088 * 0.082 0.017 -0.517 0.581
Expenditures on culture 134 0.078 * 0.093 0.020 -0.669 0.642
Healthcare expenditures 135 0.089 * 0.091 0.020 -0.734 0.692
Media expenditures 131 0.089 * 0.068 0.039 -1.219 1.346
Expenditures on industry 113 0.171 * 0.240 0.062 -1.662 1.793
Deficit 127 0.035 * 0.038 0.014 -0.389 0.440
Negative of wage arrears growth 44 0.035 0.020 0.037 -0.738 0.631  
Asterisks mark mean amplitudes that are significantly different from zero. 
 
27 TABLE V 
 DETERMINANTS OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE BUDGET CYCLE, CROSS-SECTION 
Education -1.269** -0.016 -0.139
(0.621) (0.081) (0.117)
Urbanization -1.706*** -0.175*** -0.508***
(0.515) (0.065) (0.094)
Democracy -0.801*** -0.076** -0.164***
(0.252) (0.038) (0.057)
Gov. transparency -0.272* -0.038** -0.098***
(0.145) (0.018) (0.027)
Media freedom -0.019* 0 -0.006**
(0.010) (0.001) (0.002)
Time -0.314***-0.339***-0.323***-0.323***-0.321***-0.034***-0.035***-0.034***-0.034***-0.034***-0.043***-0.049***-0.043***-0.044***-0.045***
(0.068) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Av. regional budget 0.726*** 0.886*** 0.765*** 0.610** 0.607** 0.083** 0.110*** 0.096*** 0.082** 0.082** 0.102** 0.169*** 0.123** 0.086 0.094*
(0.268) (0.279) (0.275) (0.298) (0.271) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.050) [0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.047)
Length of term -0.261 -0.281 -0.241 -0.311 -0.319 -0.017 -0.029 -0.023 -0.037 -0.014 -0.005 -0.033 -0.019 -0.051 -0.05
(0.338) (0.348) (0.367) (0.352) (0.369) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.047) (0.066) [0.063) (0.065) (0.061) (0.070)
Constant 2.814*** 3.160*** 2.923*** 2.907*** 2.900*** 0.392*** 0.420*** 0.395*** 0.395*** 0.394*** 0.557*** 0.648*** 0.566*** 0.570*** 0.585***
(0.592) (0.581) (0.584) (0.585) (0.594) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.151) [0.158) (0.151) (0.153) (0.155)
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 121 121 121 121 121 125 125 125 125 125
R
2 0.242 0.259 0.252 0.235 0.234 0.154 0.182 0.174 0.179 0.153 0.086 0.155 0.109 0.133 0.121
Education -0.202** -0.213*** -0.164**
(0.079) (0.061) (0.072)
Urbanization -0.108 -0.167* -0.216***
(0.074) (0.086) (0.078)
Democracy -0.064* -0.117*** -0.081**
(0.034) (0.043) (0.039)
Gov. transparency -0.017 -0.015 -0.029
(0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
Media freedom -0.002 -0.004*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time -0.031***-0.032***-0.031***-0.031***-0.032***-0.042***-0.043***-0.042***-0.042***-0.042***-0.035***-0.037***-0.035***-0.035***-0.036***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Av. regional budget 0.077** 0.071** 0.068** 0.054 0.056* 0.066 0.069 0.068 0.042 0.045 0.105** 0.122*** 0.105** 0.087* 0.090**
(0.030) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.047) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.048) (0.046) (0.043) (0.047) (0.048) (0.044)
Length of term -0.103** -0.102** -0.102** -0.104** -0.109** -0.013 -0.013 -0.016 -0.011 -0.033 -0.094* -0.102** -0.097* -0.104** -0.107**
(0.042) (0.046) (0.048) (0.044) (0.046) (0.049) (0.052) (0.050) (0.055) (0.051) (0.048) (0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.052)
Constant 0.388*** 0.402*** 0.388*** 0.385*** 0.391*** 0.451*** 0.472*** 0.452*** 0.443*** 0.454*** 0.424*** 0.462*** 0.429*** 0.428*** 0.435***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.090) (0.085) (0.088) (0.090) (0.088) (0.096) (0.094) (0.095) (0.093) (0.096)
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 123 123 123 123 123 125 125 125 125 125
R
2 0.236 0.186 0.191 0.18 0.186 0.195 0.166 0.184 0.148 0.19 0.176 0.181 0.166 0.16 0.162
Amplitude of education expenditure cycle Amplitude of cycle in expenditure on culture Amplitude of expenditure spending cycle
Amplitude of social expenditure cycle Amplitude of total expenditure cycle The first component of cycle amplitudes
 
Robust and adjusted for clusters within regions standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
28 TABLE VI 
EFFECT OF CYCLES ON POPULARITY OF INCUMBENTS AND PROBABILITY TO WIN 
First component of amplitudes 0.031** 0.155*
(0.015) (0.088)
Amplitude of total exp. cycle 0.065 0.087
(0.129) (0.702)
Amplitude of social exp. cycle 0.125** 0.760*
(0.057) (0.394)
Amplitude of healthcare exp. cycle 0.112 0.804
(0.097) (0.539)
Amplitude of education exp. cycle 0.234* 1.801**
(0.127) (0.702)
Amplitude of cycle in exp. on culture 0.201*** 0.814
(0.074) (0.505)
Time 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.258*** 0.192** 0.235*** 0.217*** 0.247*** 0.234***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.082) (0.076) (0.067) (0.069) (0.072) (0.069)
Time * Respective cycle amplitude -0.003 0.01 0.024 0.012 0.015 -0.036 -0.007 0.065 0.241 -0.013 0.156 -0.198
(0.007) (0.057) (0.026) (0.050) (0.064) (0.043) (0.034) (0.257) (0.169) (0.249) (0.263) (0.256)
Left -0.073* -0.078* -0.099** -0.081* -0.080* -0.091** -0.398* -0.395* -0.499** -0.391* -0.373* -0.444**
(0.042) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.225) (0.221) (0.220) (0.219) (0.219) (0.220)
Length of term 0.152** 0.11 0.116* 0.129** 0.146** 0.150** 0.874*** 0.610** 0.730** 0.806*** 0.973*** 0.908***
(0.064) (0.069) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.337) (0.309) (0.310) (0.312) (0.316) (0.338)
Relative product 0.366* 0.199 0.318 0.163 0.307 0.309 0.843 0.18 0.95 0.822 1.138 0.719
(0.218) (0.221) (0.213) (0.214) (0.218) (0.195) (1.192) (1.118) (1.107) (1.265) (1.219) (1.107)
Relative social expenditure share 0.051 0.092 0.063 0.043 0.04 0.04 -0.026 0.15 0.262 0.145 0.009 0.091
(0.109) (0.115) (0.104) (0.107) (0.102) (0.104) (0.617) (0.613) (0.544) (0.574) (0.600) (0.551)
Reltive inflation -10.826 -1.495 -2.754 -2.828 -4.437 -13.678 1.06 34.164 26.274 22.728 10.952 -19.452
(13.206) (12.396) (11.139) (11.971) (12.291) (12.786) (53.504) (47.893) (49.212) (49.525) (50.594) (52.491)
Urbanization 0.306*** 0.286*** 0.321*** 0.309*** 0.310*** 0.305*** 1.685*** 1.553*** 1.725*** 1.680*** 1.670*** 1.625***
(0.079) (0.081) (0.079) (0.081) (0.079) (0.075) (0.454) (0.443) (0.443) (0.445) (0.430) (0.455)
Constant 0.194 0.297** 0.288*** 0.320*** 0.263** 0.230**
(0.118) (0.117) (0.096) (0.118) (0.112) (0.105)
Observations 115 119 123 123 124 121 115 119 123 123 124 121
R-squared 0.269 0.197 0.234 0.2 0.232 0.276
Incumbents' populatiry, OLS Incumbent wins/first runner up/loses, ordered probit
 
Robust and adjusted for clusters within regions standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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FIGURE I 
ELECTIONS AND ACTUAL SERIES OF REGIONAL PER CAPITAL SOCIAL EXPENDITURES  
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FIGURE II 
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Education exp.
                                              Horizontal axes - months away from elections
using monthly data ( solid line ) and quarterly data ( dashed line )
Predicted percentage deviation from trend
 
FIGURE III 
UNDERESTIMATION IN QUARTERLY DATA 
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Panel A. Descriptive statistics of policy instruments and outcomes
Variable No. of obs. Mean Median SD Min Max Source Units* Time span P-value**
Total budget expenditures 7370 45.07 26.92 61.58 5.79 606.16 MF $ per capita 03/1996 - 07/2003 0.42
Social expenditures 7522 2.90 2.10 3.05 0.18 29.36 MF $ per capita 01/1996 - 07/2003 0.62
Share of social expenditures 7244 7.83 7.30 3.76 1.17 29.83 MF Percentage 01/1996 - 07/2003 0.58
Education expenditures 7528 9.28 6.12 10.24 1.29 89.40 MF $ per capita 01/1996 - 07/2003 0.78
Expenditures on culture 7512 1.07 0.68 1.28 0.12 11.31 MF $ per capita 01/1996 - 07/2003 0.65
Healthcare expenditures 7524 5.95 4.12 6.05 0.83 50.71 MF $ per capita 01/1996 - 07/2003 0.65
Media expenditures 7332 0.18 0.08 0.35 0.00 3.51 MF $ per capita 03/1996 - 07/2003 0.96
Share of media expenditures 7210 0.37 0.30 0.26 0.02 1.76 MF Percentage 03/1996 - 07/2003 0.40
Expenditures on industry 7181 2.23 0.49 7.13 0.00 90.90 MF $ per capita 01/1996 - 07/2003 0.93
Total budget revenues 7355 45.35 27.30 60.60 5.85 519.08 MF $ per capita 01/1996 - 07/2003 0.27
Tax revenues 7542 25.76 16.72 34.08 1.54 320.62 MF $ per capita 01/1996 - 07/2003 0.40
Ratio of expenditures to revenues 7094 100.10 98.47 23.83 43.47 266.37 MF Percentage 03/1996 - 07/2003 0.62
Growth 7826 0.0003 0.0005 0.0256 -0.17 0.15 GKS Percentage 02/1995 - 07/2003 0.56
Inflation 11246 0.19 0.12 0.23 -0.18 1.68 GKS Percentage 02/1992 - 07/2003 0.26
Regional wage arrears 3870 0.0064 0.0012 0.0220 0.0000 0.25 GKS $ per capita 01/1999 - 07/2003 0.76
Wage level 8410 164.61 131.09 104.05 48.21 671.72 GKS $ per capita 02/1995 - 07/2003 0.09
Money income 8463 125.24 102.65 76.32 32.00 566.03 GKS $ per capita 01/1995 - 07/2003 0.38
* "$ per capita" stands for constant 1997 US dollars per capita. ** P-values are for the test of residual autocorrelation in equation (1); see footnote 7.
Panel B. Descriptive statistics of elections
Variable No. of obs. Mean Median SD Min Max
Dummy for participation of incumbent 214 0.90 1 0.31 0 1
Dummy for incumbents’ win 192 0.65 1 0.48 0 1
Dummy for incumbent coming the third or worse 192 0.06 0 0.23 0 1
Percentage of votes for incumbent 192 53.98 56.23 22.84 4.76 99.9
Percentage of votes for main competitor of incumbent 181 32.30 28.50 20.87 0.71 82
Percentage of votes for winner 214 62.28 59.28 15.06 23.5 99.9
Percentage of votes for the first runner up 202 24.09 24.23 12.98 0.71 48
Number of candidates 214 5.69 5 2.96 1 16
Panel C. Descriptive statistics of determinants of cycle magnitude
Variable Regions Mean Median SD Min Max
Log of education in 1995 76 2.78 2.75 0.26 2.19 3.68
Log of share of urban population 86 4.17 4.23 0.28 2.91 4.61
Index of freedom of media production 81 36.25 37 14.31 0 75
Index of democracy 77 2.96 3 0.87 1 5
Index of government transparency 77 2.99 3 0.93 1 5
Dummy for length of term above 4 years 88 0.26 1 0.44 0 1  
  33